The Belarusian KGB is casting its net on the thousands of activists living in exile in Lithuania and Poland. A recent defection by a Belarusian opposition politician shows that their efforts are not always in vain.

In an exclusive interview with LRT.lt., Andrei Ostapobich, former Belarusian criminal investigator and a founder of BELPOL, a network of former officers who have joined the opposition, reveals the recruiting strategies of the regime.

How do Belarusian secret services try to recruit members of the diaspora?

The threat is quite serious. If we take two years from [the beginning of the protests in] 2020, the Belarusian security forces were busy with domestic problems and could not be so active abroad. Now, especially after the beginning of the war in Ukraine, the situation has changed.

The more resistance and freedom of speech are suppressed in Belarus, the more the regime has its hands free to act outside the country. Because the protests have now moved [from the streets] to online social networks, security services have also reorientated their approach.

They have started creating special databases and amending legislation. From the end of 2022, all [IT] companies in Belarus or those which have servers in the country have to install special equipment, which gives law enforcement full control.

They have access to everything, starting with taxis – like information about all journeys and orders. They also know who goes where, what food is delivered, or what someone buys online, which allows them to exercise complete control.

Similarly, recruitment has refocused on the internet.

There are several basic methods of recruitment. The first is using a so-called “false flag”. For example, they may present themselves as British intelligence or a British economic forum tracking the distribution of grants. Or, for example, the Lithuanian State Security Department (VSD), or as representatives of Ukrainian special services.

The same thing happened with Rico Krieger [a German national arrested in Belarus who was returned home as part of a prisoner exchange between Russia and the West in August]. They wrote to him allegedly on behalf of representatives of the Kalinowski regiment that is fighting in Ukraine.

The next method is through job search sites. Various Telegram groups are looking for people for simple tasks like transporting a parcel from Vilnius to Warsaw. The person does it, earns money and then they write to him: “You have transported C4 explosives or secret files. If you don’t cooperate with us, we will inform secret services in the EU. You will either be imprisoned there or extradited to us, which will be even worse.”

Another way is blackmail through social media. There are analytical programmes, for example from IBM, which allow you to make a complete analysis of social networks: who your relatives and friends are, who you communicate with the most. For us at BELPOL, such tools are not available, because they are very expensive – an annual license can cost 25,000 euros. Usually, such programmes are Israeli and are sold only to government agencies.

We know that Belarusian intelligence agencies, for example, find a user registered on OnlyFans, find their videos and contacts of their relatives, and then use this for blackmail. They say: “Your relatives don’t know about this, but we’ll let them know. So work for us, otherwise we will tell everyone what you do.”

Meanwhile, they also pressure the relatives who stayed in Belarus, which is why we have seen mass searches, especially this year, in the homes of active members of the diaspora.

The regime has no problems with recruitment and this problem will only grow. Those who do not fall for the recruitment attempts also simply disappear from the democratic movements to prevent further problems, which is what the regime is also trying to accomplish.

How can Belarusians abroad resist?

The best way is to never respond [to them] and to keep a close eye on what you post, where and on what topics you comment, what [Telegram] chat rooms and groups you belong to.

If you are offered some work, you need to carefully check who the people behind the offer are and what is known about them. There will almost always be recruitment attempts in all these online groups with offers of easy money.

Russian special services are much more successful in this – they control many sites and can afford to pour huge resources into these operations. Belarus is not so developed in this respect, but the threats are still serious.

Can you check if members of the opposition are working for the regime?

It’s the first time in history that a democratic community, ie the opposition in exile, has obtained the databases of the state, including that of special services. We now have all possible tools for verification, including on new passports, which can be issued, for example, to fighters of the PMC Wagner. We can check the databases and say that this passport is fictitious because they have no history of paying taxes, or working anywhere, so this person does not exist.

As an investigator, I had access to about 70 percent of these databases, and now in BELPOL, I have access to the same amount. However, some databases, for example, border databases, were inaccessible. But this tool exists, and it exists not only with us, but also with other activists, such as the Cyber Partisans group.

So far, no one has proposed a sensible concept of verifying people. For example, in Poland or Lithuania, where visas are issued to 20–30 Belarusians per day, it may be more difficult to process everyone, but our organisation can handle even such amounts.

If the authorities [in Lithuania] made enquiries to us, we could check whether a person has really worked where they indicated on their application, whether he or she has connections with law enforcement agencies and what crimes he or she has committed. We even have data on those who receive cover passports, including agents in uniform and civilians recruited based on compromising information. We have even verified these passports and we know who works for which special service.

Existing threats such as arson attacks on shopping centres, detention of agents from the diaspora and assassinations in Germany, now remain unchecked.

We should be a tool for the authorities to verify those to whom visas are issued. Or, for example, to prevent past cases when correspondents of Belarusian state-controlled TV channels come to Lithuania, make films and simply return to Belarus.

We have tried to establish connections with [Lithuanian and Polish] law enforcement, but because we are not a political entity and do not go to important meetings with high politicians, our proposals were not taken into account. This is even though we have had access to the [regime] databases for three years.

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